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Abstract: Key (2016) claims that fish do not feel pain because they lack the 
neural structures that have a contingent causal role in generating and feeling 
pain in mammals. I counterargue that no conclusive evidence supports the 
sufficiency of any mammalian neural structure to produce pain. We cannot 
move from contingent necessity in mammals to necessity in every organism. 
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Key’s (2016) target article states that pain “arises in the cortex” because the “necessary and 
sufficient […] minimal neural architecture” underpins “conscious neural processing.” Bluntly, 
he claims that species that lack the neural substrate with which mammals generate pain 
cannot feel pain— hence, because they lack this neural substrate, fish do not feel pain. Such 
a view is questionable. 
 
Just to state the obvious, feathers are necessary for birds to fly. Yet, however important 
feathers are for birds, their absence does not imply that flying is impossible. In fact, bats fly 
without feathers. Likewise, certain neural structures can be perfunctory for pain in Homo 
sapiens but irrelevant in, say, trout. The argument from anatomical similarity has some force 
in positive cases, but is very weak in negative cases. 
 
To make his case, Key points out that “brain regions,” “conscious neural processing,” 
“recurrent connections,” “dynamic and fluid activity of the network,” or “strong reciprocal 
and networked circuitry … uniquely defines the quality of the feeling.” Such evidence would 
only be persuasive if we had an account of how neural processes generate pain (Adolphs, 
2015; Aru & Bachmann, 2015; Koch, 2012). Data based on correlation are valid only insofar 
as things are the same, which is not the case here. Are fish similar enough to mammals to 
make such an inference? Unfortunately, this is precisely what is unknown since nobody 
knows how neural activity generates pain. The more one shows that fish are different from 
mammals, the less conclusive the lack of homologous neural substrates.  
 




Empirical evidence does not back up any necessary relation between neural structures and 
consciousness. At best, it shows only that certain neural structures are, in the case of human 
beings, contingently necessary. By contingent necessity, I mean that such structures are 
necessary given how natural selection singled out human beings. As far as we know, had 
Homo sapiens turned out differently, human beings might be conscious with completely 
different biological machinery. No known psycho-neural law forbids it. 
  
Once Whitehead noted that some “assumptions appear so obvious that people do not know 
what they are assuming” (Whitehead, 1925, p. 48). Likewise, Feyerabend warned that 
implicit assumptions “enter the debate in the guise of observable events” (Feyerabend, 
1975, p. 60). Such disguised assumptions are here embedded in the underlying model — 
incoming stimuli are transduced into neural signals that are eventually-yet-unfathomably 
“consciously processed,” thereby becoming “conscious (felt) neural processing” and 
allowing “pain to arise in the cortex.” Such a causal model is posited but never argued for. 
While Key assures us that in the future neuroscience will discover “how these self-
regulatory oscillations may generate the pain sensation,” at present, nobody has a clue. 
 
The very notion that neural substrates generate pain that only the organism can feel is 
problematic. First, we have no idea what biological mechanism — either at the cellular level 
or at the macro level — generates pain out of neural firings. Second, we have no idea what 
pain is. Third, we have no idea what is the entity that feels it. Because of such open issues, it 
appears difficult to draw any conclusion based on the absence of neural structures that, in 
mammals, correlate with pain. 
  
It is well known that human beings, in certain situations, feel pain. Likewise, there is a wide 
consensus that such evidence can be extended to mammals (Coenen, Schlaepfer, Maedler, 
& Panksepp, 2011; Damasio & Carvalho, 2013; Panksepp, 2011). However, to what extent, 
can the neural evidence derived from mammals be applied to other vertebrates such as 
fish? While the gist of the mechanism that generates pain is unknown, neural evidence from 
mammals cannot be generalized. 
 
Regarding the boundaries of the physical substrate of pain, even in mammals there is no 
definitive proof that neural activity is sufficient to generate pain. In all known cases, neural 
structures are involved, but so are bodies, the environment, stimuli, tissue damage, past 
and future behavior, and social interactions. We have no reason to discard all of that in 
favor of the neural underpinnings alone. Thus, we have no reason to move on from the fact 
that human beings feel pain to the much narrower hypothesis that neural structures feel 
pain. No cases of pain in a vat have ever been reported. The claim that neural processes are 
conscious would be an instance of the so-called mereological fallacy (Bennett, 2003). The 
standard approach in neuroscience is to address the physical substrate of feelings at the 
system and the cellular level (Damasio & Carvalho, 2013). It might be worth adding an 
ecological level that encompasses a broader network of causal processes, including the body 
and the environment. The substrate that generates the feeling of pain may be distributed in 
multiple systems and their interactions. 





Of course, in the present context, the key question remains whether fish have the requisite 
neural substrate. And the reply is that we cannot answer by checking for the presence of the 
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